In many markets, sellers are constrained to sell products in such a way that buyers obtain a nonnegative net utility once they have realized their valuation. A leading example is the online display advertising market. In this setting, typical business constraints impose that publishers cannot use up-front fees and thus instead run a series of "waterfall auctions" that implicitly impose different priorities over participants. Commonly, higher-priority auctions have higher reserves. 1 Another example, is online shopping, in which shoppers have the chance to return the purchased item after delivery, usually at no or low cost.
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Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro, and Gabriel Weintraub for the optimality of the aforementioned contract. For further reference, we call this condition (NR). The characterization we provide is an average monotonicity condition around the optimal static threshold that encodes information about the similarity of the ex-ante types. For example, in the case of exponential valuations, the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the distributions of the low and high type are appropriately close.
Our second main contribution characterizes the optimal mechanism when the condition mentioned above does not hold and a static contract is no longer optimal. Specifically, we prove that the optimal dynamic contract randomizes the low type and gives a deterministic allocation to the high type. Basically, randomization occurs to prevent the high type buyer from taking the low type's contract. To prove this, we first show that when (NR) is not satisfied, such a sequential screening contract with random allocations becomes feasible and yields an improvement in the seller's revenue compared to the static contract. Even though this contract yields an improvement over the static one, it does not need to be optimal. However, we are able to identify some regularity conditions that imply optimality.
More specifically, the optimal contract is characterized by an allocation probability χ ∈ (0, 1), and three thresholds θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 with θ 1 ≤ θ 2 ≤ θ 3 . In this contract, the seller allocates the object to a low-type buyer with probability χ whenever her valuation is between θ 1 and θ 3 , and asks for a payment of θ 1 · χ . When the valuation of this type is above θ 3 , the object is always allocated to her and the seller demands a payment of θ 3 − (θ 3 − θ 1 ) · χ . The high-type buyer gets the object with certainty and only when her valuation is above θ 2 , at which point the payment she has to make to the seller is θ 2 . These parameters are set in such a way that the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.
A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two dimensions. First, it can be proven that θ 1 is above the optimal threshold a seller would set if she was selling exclusively to low-type buyers. That is, the low type buyer is being allocated the object less often in the presence of high type buyers. An opposite result is true for high-type buyers, they are being allocated the object more often than if they were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is sold to the low type with some probability, which further reduces the chances of a low type to receive the object compared to a case in which there are no high-type buyers. All these values and properties can be clearly expressed for the exponential distribution case.
